Abstract. A fast software encryption algorithm is described. The computation cost is about 20 simple machine code instructions per word, although a key dependent table has to be constructed for each new key. Table construction time is some hundreds of word encryption times. It is a word based algorithm with a running key.
Introduction
The name for the system is Word Auto Key Encryption having the acronym WAKE.
We attempt to design an encryption system for medium speed encryption of blocks, and of high security. It is intended to be fast on most modern computers, and relies on repeated table use and having a large state space. It assumes the data cache can hold a table of 256 words, so that random access to larger blocks is avoided. The speed is partly attained by putting requirements on the algorithm usage. The description assumes words of 32 bits and four bytes to a word.
The nonlinear transforms are done by using a table and alternating addition and XOR provides a little extra non linearity. It takes the algorithm four stages for the word data to diuse.
Outline
The full coding is performed by generating a table from a table key. Then the start key is used to initialise the registers R3-R6, and the program below is used to code each word, with those registers holding status information and acting as a running key or autokey. The content of the registers R3-R6 is saved as the end key, allowing disjoint sequences to be treated as one. A C program for the algorithm is given in the appendix. Let the vector being transformed be V[n].
and the table t has random bits apart from R5 = M(R5,R4) the top byte whose value is different in R6 = M(R6,R5) each location. The shift is logical. A cyclic shift needs a different table. Most modern computers will easily hold the table in their cache, and we scan and replace the data words sequentially so that only essential non cache references are made. There are about 12 simple register operations per word cyphered.
Decoding is done by repeating the process, with R2 in R3=M(R3,R2) replaced by R1. The initial values of R3-R6 must be the same. The R variables should be kept in registers for best performance. Table Construction The main problem remaining is how to construct the 
Analysis
The basic operation will permute the bottom byte and place it in the top byte. The original three top bytes are shifted down one byte and mixed using XOR with three bytes from the table that generated the permutation. This is reversible. From the result, we can use the inverse permutation on the top byte to restore the bottom byte, and XOR to recover the original word. The argument is the sum of two registers and the result is put in one of these registers. The addition is also reversible.
The consequence is that if one word is changed, then the dierences must propagate, although this will not show if they are conned to R3-R6, an unlikely circumstance. To stop the propagation will usually need changes to four consecutive words.
If any word is changed systematically and the keys and other data remain xed, one expects the cipher could be broken, albeit using a large number of trials. It is assumed that the keys are changed, suciently often to prevent this attack.
The table could be replaced by random numbers but then, information leaks about repeated and null entries in the table. This leakage may have a maximum limit of 1.5 bits per entry, but the permutation reduces this statistical loss to a very small one indeed. However, using a permutation for each of the four bytes might reduce this even further.
Usage
There are many ways in which WAKE can be used eectively. The preferred way and the most straight forward is to extend the data by 2 or more words at the head and tail, and ll the new head and tail with a nonce or fresh random data, the same at both ends. The decoder checks that tail words and the head words are the same. Instead of equality we can use a known keyed relation, but this is overkill for most simple uses. This protocol prevents most attacks and gives tamper detection directly rather than as a hoped for side eect. This we call mode one.
A second mode is to change the start key for each data block. A third mode, where these changes are dicult, and we need the data to occupy exactly the same space, is a double scan method. Just encode the block using a start key. Using another start key encode in the reverse direction. This ensures that single bit changes are likely to change about one half of all the generated bits. There is a slight tail weakness, which can be cured by coding the last four words backwards before doing the above.
The third mode can use a keyed hash fuction of the same general type, having the same start key and the same table to produce a four word hash. This hash can be thoroughly mixed with the rst four words, so that these change for each message, and we proceed as before. The suggested hash function and protocol is given in the appendix. The hash is nearly ve times as fast as the cypher function.
The table key should be changed for long messages, and may even be derived from the start key. If it is changed about every ten thousand words, the slowing is about two or three per cent.
The overhead of generating the table may be too large for short messages. Mode three can be used for short messages using the same table. However, unless the start key is changed or the messages known to be unique, for example numbered, the low entropy attacks are possible.
Error propagation may have to be prevented in some situations, such as video transmission. This can be done by changing the running key as frequently as required and generating the running keys using the same algorithm in a suitable way.
It is trivial to generate a sequence of random numbers for use as a one time pad or for other purposes. A keyed hash can be made readily. However the end key allows decryption, so it should be further encoded before using it as an authenticator.
Weaknesses
If the table t is known, then with ve consecutive plain cipher text pairs, we can determine the current values of R3-R6. If the table is not known, a repeated change at one place may break the table. This is prevented if a fresh start key is used each time. There are other methods using salt, nonces, or confounders.
If a single scan is used then a change in the last word will not propagate or be transformed. The usages given above will prevent this happening. Another way is to use V[n]=R6 and endure the slightly longer decryption. However whether this is a problem depends on other details of the system, such as tamper detection. A one time pad using XOR suers more severely from this defect. This is a word based algorithm, so for transmissions between dierent computers, the big-end, little-end convention has to be settled.
As each single line of the program is reversible, we can make a slightly stronger version which is slower, by coding with V[n]=R6, and using a more complicated decoding routine, using a table derived from t.
Performance
The program processes about three bytes per microsecond on a Sparc, ELC @ 33MHtz. computer. Table generation of the form described, takes the same time as coding about 250 words.
How secure is this algorithm? A few tests have been applied. The distribution seems random. The loop lengths made with a two step version seem of the right length, and there seems no obvious attack. The large key and state spaces prevent some forms of attack.
The security can be enhanced by increasing the number of stages in the basic algorithm from the four given, but at a reduction in speed, however it is hoped that four stages will suce.
Instead of using one table we can use a separate table for each stage, with no loss in speed. As the tables would now take four times as long to generate and four times as much space, we note that the tables can be overlapped. In this case, some of the permutations have to be restricted.
Implementation
Although the algorithm is simple, it does need access to convenient shift orders for ultimate speed. A logical right shift is perhaps the easiest, and a cyclic shift made almost as easy. In this case a simply transformed table is needed, with the left most permutation byte p[n] being replaced by p[n] XOR n. The two methods are then compatible. If only an arithmetic right shift is available, then a masking operation is needed to be compatible. We can use the arithmetic right shift without a masking operation, and obtain an equally good but dierent encypherment. In this case, it is more dicult to reverse some steps, but it makes no dierence for the simple case.
One some machines, the shifts which are multiples of 8 may be replaced by byte operations. In particular, using the leftmost byte for table look up in a byte operation may eliminate the shift and mask operation.
The cypher routine given in the appendix can be used for all the protocols suggested.
Conclusion
We have given a simple fast encyphering algorithm, suitable for large bulk data, and for short messages where one key is changed. It is suitable for keyed hashes, used for verication.
Its defects remain unknown to us, and so should be pointed out.
